The title of Bruno Chaouat’s Is Theory Good for the Jews? refers to a school of thought—variously dubbed “critical theory,” “postmodern theory,” or simply “Theory”—that dominates philosophy departments in France and literature departments in the U.S., and has infiltrated the humanities everywhere. Articulated by thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, Theory’s overarching principle is the rejection of absolute truth, linguistic meaning, conventional morality, and the ideals of civilization and progress; its central characteristic is its own obfuscatory jargon. In his book, Chaouat elucidates the troubling tendency of Theory’s leading lights to pay particular attention to the Jews, and to do so in way that is never complimentary, especially where Israel is involved.

Michael Weingrad writes in his review:

Chaouat shows how various postcolonial theorists justify or ignore Muslim anti-Semitism, seen as a legitimate response to European colonialism. Indeed, as Chaouat writes, a number of French writers are less concerned with Muslim attacks on Jews than with the [alleged] political threat posed by those European Jews who decry anti-Semitism even when exhibited by Muslims, and who defend Israel against those who would see the Jewish state destroyed. . . .

Chaouat traces some part of these inversions to Theory’s abstraction of Jews and Jewishness into symbols, fungible moral tokens easily transferred into other bank accounts. It is little surprise that intellectuals who see Jews only as de-territorialized outsiders have little use for actual flesh-and-blood Jews, let alone those with a nation-state. . . . [Today’s] postmodern theorists prefer to support projects of resistance and political violence on behalf of what they see as downtrodden groups. If Jews and Israelis, who are now defined [by most devotees of Theory] as white colonialists or even Nazis, must be thrown under history’s bus as part of this utopian project, so be it.

[But], one might respond, isn’t all this a problem not of Theory but of the radical left more generally? . . . [T]he anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism of postmodern intellectuals, their fetishization of the Palestinians and of violent jihadists, have less to do with new readings of Derrida than with longstanding features of left-wing political ideology. . . . For all his analytical acuity and moral passion, Chaouat leaves the broader historical and philosophical context of Theory’s relation to the left largely unexplored. . . .

While valuable and trenchant Chaouat’s book resembles other recent attempts by left-liberal Jewish academics to push back against their more militantly radical colleagues. . . . One applauds these efforts, but viewed from outside the truncated political system of today’s professoriate they can seem both belated and somewhat pyrrhic: old-fashioned liberals asking their radical colleagues not to march them off the same gangplank as were their conservative colleagues, and faculty who support Israel’s continued existence pleading for Jewish membership in the club of the aggrieved.

Between Sunday and Tuesday, the Israeli air force and navy carried out operation “Bashan Arrow”—after the biblical name for the Golan Heights—which involved 350 strikes on Syrian military assets, disabling, according to the the IDF, between 70 and 80 percent of Syria’s “strategic” weaponry. The operation destroyed Scud missiles, weapons factories, anti-aircraft batteries, chemical weapons, and most of the Syrian navy.

Important as these steps are, Jerusalem will also have to devise a longer-term approach to dealing with Syria. Ehud Yaari has some suggestions, and also notes one of the most important consequences for Israel of Bashar al-Assad’s demise:

One of the most important commentators in Tehran, Suheil Karimi, has warned on Iranian television that “without Assad, ultimately there will be no Hizballah.” Weakened, confused, and decapitated, Hizballah is bound to lose much of its political clout inside Lebanon.

Yaari believes that the next steps in Syria should revolve around making and maintaining alliances, while staying on guard:

Military deployments along the Golan Heights border with Syria have taken place, but should not reach a point where they are seen on the other side of the border as a menace. There is no reason to fear the rebel factions in the adjacent Dara’a and Quneitra provinces [along the Israeli border]. Many of their commanders were assisted by Israel for years before they had to accept a deal with Assad in 2018. Some of those commanders regularly met Israeli officers in Tiberias and in other places. Many villages in this region have benefited in the past decade from Israel’s Good Neighborhood operation, which provided humanitarian aid on a large scale. . . .

Turkey has managed to have the upper hand in its competition with Iran over influence in Syria. Rapprochement with [the Turkish president Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan would be complicated yet not impossible.