A Single Coin Suggests the Bar Kokhba Revolt Was Bigger Than Previously Assumed

While archaeologists have found numerous coins produced by participants in Simon Bar Kokhba’s revolt against Roman rule in 132 CE, the recent discovery of one in a cave near the city of Modi’in suggests that the revolt was not centered exclusively in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem but instead spread farther than most historians had realized. Amanda Borschel-Dan writes:

Historians have traditionally held that the revolt had little support among residents who lived north of Jerusalem. This coin, along with recent discoveries of other refugee caves, points to rebel activity in the area. . . . Also found in the cave, located near the Arab village of Qibya, were potsherds and glass shards that have been similarly dated to the revolt.

The Bar Kokhba or Great Revolt, which lasted three and a half years, was the last and arguably greatest of several Jewish uprisings against foreign rulers in ancient times. The rebels prepared well ahead of time, and, according to the 3rd-century historian Dio Cassius, Roman legions were brought from other outposts in the empire to quell it. [He also] writes that some 50 Jewish fortresses and over 1,000 settlements were destroyed, along with hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives lost. . . .

The Bar Kokhba coinage is unique in its widespread systematic recycling of old coins, which were re-stamped, or overstruck, with the Jews’ diecasts. According to the leading numismatist Yaakov Meshorer, . . . the reason was political—for revenge.

Read more at Times of Israel

More about: Ancient Rome, Archaeology, History & Ideas, Simon bar Kokhba

The Next Diplomatic Steps for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States

July 11 2025

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israel diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict