After being kept classified for over 70 years, the contents of a file in the UK’s state archives labeled “Anti-Semitism in Great Britain” were made public last month. The documents in it, composed by the Ministry of Information—created at the outbreak of World War II to produce propaganda and maintain morale—record rising anti-Semitism throughout the country, some limited concern, a reluctance to take any action, and a general inclination on the part of officials to blame the Jews for encouraging prejudice against themselves. Robert Philpot writes:

During the course of the war, as the East End of London was subject to heavy German bombing and mothers and children were evacuated, many Jews were sent to live in areas without large Jewish populations. It has been estimated that half of those evacuated from the East End—the epicenter of the capital’s Jewish community at the time—were Jews.

[The ministry’s director general, Cyril] Radcliffe, suggested that resentment against Jewish evacuees was a factor in stoking tensions. Jews, he advised Minister of Information Brendan Bracken, had displayed “a lack of pleasant standards of conduct as evacuees.” A further source of complaints reported to him by the ministry’s regional civil servants was the allegation that Jews paid “inordinate attention to the possibilities of the ‘black market.’” . . . [Radcliffe] also appeared to fear that countering hatred of Jews might simply publicize anti-Semitic myths.

The Times of London, [which first publicized the documents], notes [that] “there was a price to pay for the British authorities’ tolerance of anti-Semitism” during the war. It cites the anti-Jewish rioting which occurred in 1947 in the UK after the Irgun hanged two British sergeants in Mandate-era Palestine in retaliation for the execution of three of its members.

Although nobody was killed, the violence . . . shocked many. . . . Moreover, while events in Palestine had been the immediate cause, the link between wartime anti-Semitism and its thankfully brief violent postwar manifestation was a clear one. Britain was already struggling under the weight of the cost of the war and reconstruction, with austerity imposed by the government and rationing and controls still largely in place. In 1947, these difficulties were compounded by a sharp economic downturn and rising unemployment.

In short, Philpot concludes, many Britons were happy to have someone to blame.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.