At the beginning of the 20th century, Aramaic—once the Near East’s lingua franca and the native tongue of most of the world’s Jews—was widely spoken in Jewish communities in Iraq, Iran, and other areas. Since then various waves of persecution, of which the depredations of Islamic State are only the most recent, have greatly reduced the number of speakers of the language. Jacqueline Taylor describes one of several Jewish dialects of what linguists term Neo-Aramaic:

The community of Jewish Neo-Aramaic speakers from Urmia in the Western Azerbaijan region of Iran called themselves Nash Didan, which translates to “our people.” This community of roughly 400 families named their language Lishán Didán, which translates to “our language.”

Lishán Didán and other Jewish dialects are drastically different linguistically from the language of the Christian communities occupying the same land. . . . There has been a robust movement to preserve Christian dialects of Aramaic, but there is no similar mission to preserve the Jewish dialects. . . .

The current leadership of Iran has destroyed the ancient Nash Didan cemetery, leaving in its place an unfinished hospital and empty lot. The land of Urmia was inhabited for centuries by the same small Jewish community since the Babylonian captivity. [Already] outdated assessments show fewer than 5,000 speakers of Lishán Didán, and those speakers are very advanced in age.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.