Louisa May Alcott’s Jewish Portuguese Ancestors

Jan. 17 2020

As a child, the celebrated 19th-century American novelist Louisa May Alcott was told that her maternal grandfather, Joseph May, was the descendant of Portuguese Jews. Although May was a practicing Unitarian, the family reportedly took pride in its Jewish ancestry. Alcott’s biographer and relative Eve LaPlante writes:

Joseph May [was] a late-18th-century Boston businessman whose Portuguese Jewish ancestors immigrated to Sussex, England, just before 1500. The Mays spent more than a century in England, becoming prosperous enough to cross the Atlantic. . . . Around 1640, the Mays—also spelled Mayes, Maies, and Maize—settled in Massachusetts, where one of their descendants was the quintessentially Yankee author of Little Women.

In 1496, King Manuel I of Portugal had given Jews and Muslims a choice between conversion and leaving the country. At the time, the country had a sizable Jewish population, which included tens of thousands of refugees from the Spanish expulsion four years earlier. Converted Jews often took new surnames; names of months, such as Maio, were popular choices. During the subsequent decades, there was a steady trickle of Portuguese Jews to Britain, Amsterdam, France, and the New World. LaPlante adds:

Today, only a few thousand Jews live in Portugal. But . . . nearly one in five Portuguese citizens, according to a recent study in the American Journal of Human Genetics, has Jewish ancestry. Apparently, the number of Portuguese Jews forced to convert to Christianity half a millennium ago was far larger than historians previously believed. As for the countless Jews who fled Portugal, their descendants include the economist David Ricardo and the philosopher Baruch Spinoza, as well as Louisa May Alcott.

Read more at Forward

More about: Literature, Portugal, Sephardim, U.S history

Fake International Law Prolongs Gaza’s Suffering

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Gaza War 2023, International Law