While the ancient history of the Galilee, the Judean Hills, and other parts of the Land of Israel are fairly well known, few are aware of the once-thriving Jewish community in the Gaza Strip. In a recent Hebrew book on the subject, the Israeli journalist Haggai Hoberman tells the story of Jewish life in Gaza from biblical times to the present. Nadav Shragai shares some of its surprising findings:

Gaza . . . was conquered by King Jonathan the Hasmonean in 145 BCE; it is mentioned in the Jerusalem Talmud in the 4th century CE; Nathan of Gaza, [the “prophet” of the false messiah Shabbetai Tsvi] declared him “the savior of Israel” in the synagogue of Gaza City in 1660.

There is also the rabbi and poet Israel Najara, who was the chief rabbi of Gaza for five years until he died in 1625. He was the son of the Safed rabbi Moses Najara, who was one of the students of [the famed kabbalist] Isaac Luria. Israel Najara wrote some 650 poems, both secular and religious, some of which have never been seen in print.

Najara’s Aramaic hymn, Yah Ribon, remains a favorite at Sabbath tables today. But perhaps the most surprising episode in Gazan history came with the return of Jews there at the end of the 19th century:

Gaza was home to Islamic religious leaders who were no less devout than those of our time, but different. . . . Who would believe that only 110 years ago, then-chief rabbi of Gaza Nissim Binyamin Ohana, and then-mufti of Gaza Sheikh Abdullah al-Alami, co-authored a book? [Moreover], the children of Gaza—Jews and Arabs—liked to wear daggers embellished with locally produced beads. On Muslim holidays, [the local Zionist leader] Avraham Elkayam would take part in horseback and wrestling competitions. “We purposely lost to the Bedouin, lest they be offended,” the Jews of Gaza would later recall.

In 1921, when news of the rioting in Jaffa spread, the Jews of Gaza decided not to test their relations with the local Arabs and left the city, even though Mufti Hajj Said al-Husseini . . . begged them not to. He promised no one would harm them. Only when things calmed down did the Jews return.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.