Half a Century Ago, Elie Kedourie Understood That Neither Zionism Nor Western Imperialism Was the Cause of the Middle East’s Problems

The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies was one of the great works of the eminent 20th-century historian of the Arab world, Elie Kedourie. To mark the 50th anniversary of its publication, Robert D. Kaplan reflects on its author’s legacy. But first he explains the book’s title:

Chatham House, or the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and its director of studies for three decades, Arnold Toynbee, become in Kedourie’s book illustrative of an elitist British sentimentality toward the cultures of the Middle East (and to Arab nationalism in particular) that hid from, rather than faced up to, the impure, realist requirements of politics and necessary force.

In other words, the “Chatham House version” of things was not unlike the orthodoxies held by the American State Department or the British foreign office today. Kaplan continues:

Elie Kedourie grew up in a wealthy Jewish family in Baghdad, and as a fifteen-year-old schoolboy witnessed close-up the June 1941 pogrom, known as the farhud (“looting”), in which the Iraqi army and police murdered over 180 Jewish men, women, and children, and raped countless Jewish women. . . . Kedourie, in The Chatham House Version, blames the British authorities for failing to protect the Jews, despite having taken over responsibility for Mesopotamia from the Ottoman empire in the aftermath of World War I.

Kedourie’s essential diagnosis of Great Britain’s Arab policy in his lifetime was that the British foreign office’s awe of an exotic culture, combined with the “snare” of a misunderstood familiarity toward English-speaking Arabs—who used the same words, but meant very different things when discussing such issues as rule-of-law and constitutions—led to a profound lapse of policy judgment: toward which, one must add guilt regarding the post-World War I border arrangements that allowed for, among other things, a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In the minds of this naïve generation of British officials, once Zionism and imperialism could be done away with, the Arabs would enjoy peaceful and stable institutions. Fifty years ago, Kedourie countered with what in recent decades has since become a commonplace: that neither imperialism nor Zionism was the problem.

Read more at National Interest

More about: Iraqi Jewry, Middle East, United Kingdom, Zionism

 

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy