New Evidence Found of Life-Sized Canaanite Idols

June 24 2020

As the Bible mentions repeatedly, the pre-Israelite inhabitants of the promised land were enthusiastic worshippers of graven images. While archaeologists have discovered countless small idols, they have not found any that are life-sized. But a recent discovery by Yosef Finkelstein at the Bronze Age Canaanite city of Lachish suggests that such statues once existed. Rossella Tercatin writes:

After recently uncovering a spatula-like object, [Finkelstein] noticed some parallels with a similar item previously unearthed in Hazor in the Upper Galilee, a different Canaanite site. “The two scepters from Lachish and Hazor date to the end of Canaanite occupation at these sites (the 12th and 13th centuries BCE, respectively). Both come from cult-like contexts, are of similar size, and are made of bronze coated with silver,” he wrote in the paper.

In addition, the two findings—each of them a few centimeters long—present a striking resemblance with a third artifact: the scepter held by a 27-centimeter-high figurine found at Megiddo almost a century ago. The figurine, made of bronze but completely coated in gold, depicts a seated god holding a spatula-like scepter.

“The form of this scepter is a miniature version of the objects discovered at Lachish and Hazor,” he pointed out, highlighting that the figure has been identified as the Canaanite god El. By comparing the three items, Garfinkel was able to suggest that the bigger artifacts were likely part of sculptures proportionate to their size.

“The archaeological context of the object from Lachish and its iconography strongly suggest that it belonged to a life-sized statue of the Canaanite god El,” . . . he concluded.

Read more at Jerusalem Post

More about: Ancient Israel, Archaeology, Canaanites, Idolatry

The U.S. Has Finally Turned Up the Heat on the Houthis—but Will It Be Enough?

March 17 2025

Last Tuesday, the Houthis—the faction now ruling much of Yemen—said that they intend to renew attacks on international shipping through the Red and Arabian Seas. They had for the most part paused their attacks following the January 19 Israel-Hamas cease-fire, but their presence has continued to scare away maritime traffic near the Yemeni coast, with terrible consequences for the global economy.

The U.S. responded on Saturday by initiating strikes on Houthi missile depots, command-and-control centers, and propaganda outlets, and has promised that the attacks will continue for days, if not weeks. The Houthis responded by launching drones, and possibly missiles, at American naval ships, apparently without result. Another missile fired from Yemen struck the Sinai, but was likely aimed at Israel. As Ari Heistein has written in Mosaic, it may take a sustained and concerted effort to stop the Houthis, who have high tolerance for casualties—but this is a start. Ron Ben-Yishai provides some context:

The goal is to punish the Houthis for directly targeting Western naval vessels in the Red Sea while also exerting indirect pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. . . . While the Biden administration did conduct airstrikes against the Houthis, it refrained from a proactive military campaign, fearing a wider regional war. However, following the collapse of Iran’s axis—including Hizballah’s heavy losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—the Trump administration appears unafraid of such an escalation.

Iran, the thinking goes, will also get the message that the U.S. isn’t afraid to use force, or risk the consequences of retaliation—and will keep this in mind as it considers negotiations over its nuclear program. Tamir Hayman adds:

The Houthis are the last proxy of the Shiite axis that have neither reassessed their actions nor restrained their weapons. Throughout the campaign against the Yemenite terrorist organization, the U.S.-led coalition has made operational mistakes: Houthi regime infrastructure was not targeted; the organization’s leaders were not eliminated; no sustained operational continuity was maintained—only actions to remove immediate threats; no ground operations took place, not even special-forces missions; and Iran has not paid a price for its proxy’s actions.

But if this does not stop the Houthis, it will project weakness—not just toward Hamas but primarily toward Iran—and Trump’s power diplomacy will be seen as hollow. The true test is one of output, not input. The only question that matters is not how many strikes the U.S. carries out, but whether the Red Sea reopens to all vessels. We will wait and see—for now, things look brighter than they did before.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Donald Trump, Houthis, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen