Nowadays, most Israeli wine is produced in the northern areas of the country, but in the first centuries of the Common Era the Negev desert was famous for its viticulture. By the 7th century, however, this ceased to be the case. Archaeologists and paleobotanists examining seeds found in ancient Negev trash dumps believe they have discovered why, writes Amanda Borschel-Dan:

Byzantine-era texts laud the vinum Gazetum or “Gaza wine.” The sweet white wine, [produced in the Negev], was exported from the port of Gaza throughout the Mediterranean and beyond, usually in amphorae known as Gaza jars. The Gaza jars were found in large quantities in the Negev trash pits.

Contributing factors to the [decline of Negev wine production] included the Late Antique Little Ice Age, a bizarre widespread climate anomaly that began with a series of massive volcanic eruptions in the 530s and 540s CE, and the Justinian plague of 541-549.

Daniel Fuks, [the lead author of the recent study], believes that one of the main forces causing the decline [was] the decreasing demand for imported wine in a world beset by plague—conservative estimates figure some 20 percent of population centers were killed off—and resultant economic depression even while . . . still being heavily taxed by emperor Justinian.

The Negev settlements had . . . an export-based industry and became more and more reliant on markets. When demand dried up . . . these farther-flung locations would have been the first to be affected. Even if trade continued in Gaza, the Negev settlements are farther away from the port and would require a higher price for their products to make the journey worth the traders’ while.

Noah Rothman provides a worthwhile reminder of why a nuclear Iran is a threat not just to Israel, but to the United States:

For one, Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism on earth. It exports terrorists and arms throughout the region and beyond, and there are no guarantees that it won’t play a similarly reckless game with nuclear material. At minimum, the terrorist elements in Iran’s orbit would be emboldened by Iran’s new nuclear might. Their numbers would surely grow, as would their willingness to court risk.

Iran maintains the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. It can certainly deliver a warhead to targets inside the Middle East, and it’s fast-tracking the development of space-launch vehicles that can threaten the U.S. mainland. Even if Tehran were a rational actor that could be reliably deterred, an acknowledged Iranian bomb would kick-start a race toward nuclear proliferation in the region. The Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, and others would probably be compelled to seek their own nuclear deterrents, leading to an infinitely more complex security environment.

In the meantime, Iran would be able to blackmail the West, allowing it occasionally to choke off the trade and energy exports that transit the Persian Gulf and to engage in far more reckless acts of international terrorism.

As for the possible consequences, Rothman observes:

Iranian retaliation might be measured with the understanding that if it’s not properly calibrated, the U.S. and Israel could begin taking out Iranian command-and-control targets next. If the symbols of the regime begin crumbling, the oppressed Iranian people might find the courage to finish the job. If there’s anything the mullahs fear more than the U.S. military, it’s their own citizens.