In 1902, butcher shops on New York’s Lower East Side raised the price of a popular cut of beef from 12 cents per pound to 18, due to a price hike by the cartel of businesses that at the time controlled most of the U.S. meat market. In response, a group of Jewish housewives organized boycotts and demonstrations, which are the subject of Scott Seligman’s book The Great Kosher Meat War of 1902. The author discusses the events that followed in an interview by Andrew Silow-Carrol:

There were [in 1902] some 600 kosher butchers on the Lower East Side—a lot of storefronts—and most of the women went to butchers in the immediate neighborhood. It was an interesting relationship, because there had to be trust on both sides. The women had to be assured they were getting kosher meat, and the butchers had to offer credit. Families couldn’t afford meat until the paycheck came home.

[The organizers] decided they were going to do a boycott, and overnight must have recruited 3,000 women, just going door to door, because squads of five took up positions across the Lower East Side. It wasn’t supposed to be violent. They were supposed to approach customers, remonstrate with anybody who wanted to buy meat and ask them not to do it. But when people crossed the lines, that’s when all hell broke loose. They grabbed the meat, threw it in the gutter and threw kerosene on it so it was inedible.

Although there was violence, this was a very well-disciplined event. Nobody ate the meat. Absolutely no one was supposed to eat meat and there was no looting. Only butcher shops and some restaurants were targeted. It wasn’t like street riots today, with people smashing windows up and down the street, and it stopped for Shabbat.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.