On the holiday of Purim, which begins this evening, communal feasts and celebrations are common—or at least were before the coronavirus. But in America 150 years ago, a different custom developed. Zev Eleff writes:

The Purim story resonates with today’s American Jews. It’s packed with contemporary themes such as charges of dual loyalty. . . . With many Jews marrying outside of their religion, Purim rings relevant on the issue of intermarriage as well.

Yet, Esther’s tale was perhaps less useful in the 19th century when America’s Jews were not so visible and they weren’t as concerned about assimilation. When a group of New York Jewish socialites invented the Purim ball in the 1860s, their intention was to downplay Purim’s Persian legend. Their goal was to be the same, not different. They wanted to be counted in Manhattan’s upper crust.

In January 1860, Myer Isaacs, a lawyer and political activist, issued a proposal in the pages of the Jewish Messenger, a weekly published in his native New York by his father, Samuel Myer Isaacs. The younger Isaacs suggested “Purim night should be selected as the occasion of a good fancy-dress ball, the proceeds to be devoted to charity.” Isaacs’s assumptions about the linkage between a classy event and fundraising was typical of the “charity market” among Victorian-era elites.

Two years later, Isaacs had better luck, and from then on the Purim Ball was a grand affair held at prestigious venues. Eleff continues:

The success of New York’s Purim Ball inspired others to organize similar events. By the 1880s, it was replicated in dozens of communities. St. Louis’s Jews were very proud of their “well-regulated” masquerade ball which, they claimed was “one of the most enjoyable affairs in the society world. In 1891, the Purim program held in Philadelphia, much influenced by a local aristocratic spirit, was fashioned more like a debutante ball, a coming-of-age event for upper-class young ladies.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.