Few living scholars have exercised as much influence on the study of medieval Judaism as Haym Soloveitchik, himself the scion of a distinguished rabbinic dynasty who chose not to pursue the rabbinate, even as he acquired a reputation for immense talmudic erudition. Reviewing the recently published third volume of Soloveitchik’s collected essays, Alan Jotkowitz comments on his knack for characterizing the approach and style of the great European rabbis of the Middle Ages, taking as an example his analysis of Rabbi Avraham ben David of Posquières (1125-1198). This rabbi, usually referred to by the acronym Ra’avad, is best known for his sharply critical glosses to Moses Maimonides’ halakhic magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah, but Soloveitchik argues that his other work deserves greater consideration:

Why then was Ra’avad known primarily as a Maimonidean critic? Soloveitchik suggests it is due to the ill fate of living at the same time as Rashi. . . . He writes, “[Ra’avad’s] works, as I have noted, did not attain that scope or total cohesion which was Rashi’s when he consummated the work of centuries, nor did they approach that wondrous felicity of presentation which again was Rashi’s alone. Indeed, Ra’avad’s commentaries are singularly lacking in literary grace.”

In the writings of Professor Soloveitchik, [these figures] come alive as people. You almost get the sense that he knew them personally. For example, “Ra’avad was a loner’s loner. Whether he had some commentarial tradition we shall never know, because he basically declined to use it. . . . Ra’avad explored new continents and illuminated dark places. Like most explorers of wild lands, he was a man who was wont to stride alone, and if someone collided with him on the way, he could get very irate.”

As for Rashi, “Many of the traits that we associate with Rashi—reticence, modesty, temperateness of expression—are common to the literature of the 11th century.” Where did Soloveitchik’s impression of Rashi come from? In a note, he comments that “close to a decade’s work in the literature of the 11th century has given me the sustained impression that Rashi is unique in the near total cohesion of his thought and in the lucidity of his presentation but hardly atypical in character and general bearing.”

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.