A pro-Western country that enjoys good relations with the Jewish state, Georgia—which regained its independence after the collapse of the USSR in 1991—was one of the very first countries to become Christian. It was also home to a historic Jewish community, and a few thousand Jews still live there. Moreover, the Georgian Church has its own ties to the Land of Israel. Lazar Berman writes:

Jerusalem is famous for its Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian shrines, and today there is not a single Georgian church to be found in all of Israel. But for hundreds of years, Georgians were a ubiquitous, even dominant force among Christians in the Holy Land. Georgian monks and princes built dozens of churches, and held some of Christianity’s most sacred sites.

As Georgia’s political power waned, its grip on Holy Land shrines slipped, and by the Ottoman era, all its monasteries and churches were in the hands of more powerful communities. Ancient Georgian inscriptions and frescoes were neglected and even vandalized, a process that continued into modern times.

The heart of the Georgian presence in Jerusalem was the Monastery of the Cross, which sits today in the valley beneath the Israel Museum and the Knesset. As Georgian tradition has it, King Mirian III, [who first made Christianity the country’s official religion], purchased the land in the 4th century, and a 5th-century ruler founded the first monastery on the site. . . . According to written sources, [however], the current fortress-like monastery was built by a Georgian monk named Prochore in the 11th century after the earlier structure was torn down in the Arab conquest of Palestine

Georgian Jews began moving to Palestine in the middle of the 19th century, primarily near the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem. According to a 1915 census, more than 6 percent of the Jews in Jerusalem and almost a quarter of the Jews in the Old City were Georgian. They were forced to flee their homes for good during the 1929 Arab riots.

Critics of the American bombing raid on Iran have warned that it could lead to dangerous retaliation, and risk dragging the U.S. into a broader conflict. (How this could be a greater risk than allowing the murderous fanatics who govern Iran to have nuclear weapons is a separate question.) Yesterday, Iran indeed retaliated. Noah Rothman writes:

On Monday, Iranian state media released a high-production-value video revealing [the government’s] intention to strike U.S. forces inside neighboring Qatar. A bombastic statement from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council accompanying the video claimed that Iran had launched a salvo of ten missiles at the U.S.-manned Al Udeid Air Base, which “pulverized” American forces. In reality, the missiles seem to have all been intercepted before they reached their targets. No casualties have been reported.

In fact, the Iranians quietly gave Qatar—the Gulf state with which they have the best relations—advance warning of the attack, knowing that the Qataris would then pass it on to the U.S. Thus prepared, American forces were able to minimize the damage. Rothman continues:

So far, Iran’s retaliatory response to U.S. strikes on its nuclear program looks a lot like its reaction to the 2020 attack that killed the Revolutionary Guard commander Qassem Suleimani—which is to say that it seems like Tehran is seeking an offramp to avoid a potentially existential conflict with the United States.

Now, it’s important to note that this is only a face-saving climb-down if that’s how we want to interpret it. The only reason why we remember the Iranian operation aimed at avenging Soleimani’s death as a cease-fire overture is because we decided to take it that way. We didn’t have to do that. One-hundred-and-ten U.S. service personnel were treated for injuries as a result of that direct and unprecedented ballistic-missile attack on U.S. forces in Iraq. . . . The U.S. could have regarded that strike as an unacceptable precedent, but the Trump administration had made its point. By simply deeming deterrence to have been restored, the U.S. helped bring that condition about.

It appears that is precisely what the U.S. has done this time. Last night both Washington and Tehran announced a cease-fire, one that includes Israel. Whether it will hold remains to be seen; Iran already managed to get in a deadly, eleventh-hour attack on civilians in Beersheba. If Jerusalem knew such an arrangement was in the cards—and there is every reason to think it did—then its military activities over the past few days start to make a great deal of sense.

Since June 13, there has been some lack of clarity about whether Israel’s goal is to destroy Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities, or to destabilize the regime. Now it seems that the IDF has been doing precisely what it has done in the final phase of almost every prior war: try to inflict as much damage as possible upon the enemy’s military infrastructure before the U.S. blows the whistle and declares the war over—thus reestablishing deterrence and leaving its enemy’s offensive capabilities severely weakened.

In the next item, I’ll turn to some of the nonmilitary targets Israel chose.