In the first book of Kings, God tells Elijah to go to Aram—a territory roughly contiguous with modern-day Syria—and anoint Hazael its king. Second Kings describes Hazael’s invasion of the Land of Israel, where his army fought against Judea, Israel, and the Philistines—destroying the Philistine city of Gath. While archaeologists have long had other evidence about Hazael, who reigned in the latter half of the 9th century BCE, they recently made another discovery about his military exploits. Nathan Steinmeyer writes:

Recent excavations by Bar-Ilan University, led by Aren Maeir, have shed new light on the destruction of biblical Gath, the Philistine city famously home to Goliath. The team, which has been digging at Gath (modern Tell es-Safi) for 25 seasons, has repeatedly uncovered evidence of large-scale destruction across the entire tell. This destruction is firmly connected to the 9th-century BCE. campaign of Hazael.

Until recently, however, the team did not have a clear picture of exactly how the city fell. But during the 2021 season, new evidence emerged that might explain the city’s final demise—a nearly 30-foot-long break in the city’s massive fortification system. According to the archaeologists, this gap likely represents the very section where the Arameans broke through the walls of the Philistine city after a long siege. This, Maeir believes, may be “the earliest known, on-the-ground evidence of a siege anywhere in the world.”

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”