The Torah states on four occasions that the shekel, a standard weight or coin of silver, is equivalent to twenty gerah, the latter being a smaller measurement. Elsewhere, in the book Deuteronomy, it states, “Thou shalt not have in thy bag diverse weights, a great and a small,” that could be used for deceiving customers. A recent discovery brings together these two edicts, as Aryeh Savir writes:

Israeli archaeologists digging in the City of David in Jerusalem’s Old City came upon an extremely rare finding from the days of the First Temple—a biblical weight called a gerah that was probably used by a cheater [who lived around] 589 BCE.

The weight is made of reddish limestone, smoothed and well-polished, and on its upper part appear two deeply engraved straight, parallel and thick lines, indicating a weight of two gerah, or 0.944 grams. However, when weighed, the researchers were surprised to find that it weighed 3.61 grams—more than three times its expected weight.

Only one other gerah weight was discovered in Israel.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.