Located in southwestern Missouri amid the Ozark Mountains, Springfield is the state’s third-largest city. Its Jewish community is the subject of a recent book by Mara Cohen Ioannides, published by the local county historical society. Andrew Sullender writes:

According to [Ioannides’s] research, the first Jews in Springfield were among a flux of German immigrants following the civil war, the first of which was Ludwig Ullman. Having previously worked as a Union Army doctor, Ullman came to Springfield between 1861 and 1864 to open a pharmacy downtown. He later was a founding member of the Springfield Medical Association.

“German immigrants coming to southwest Missouri were both Christian and Jewish, but the German community at the time didn’t differentiate between the groups, they were all Germans. They all saw themselves as culturally the same. So, Jews were accepted in associations where there were other Germans who were accepted,” Ioannides said.

Jews in Springfield became merchants and business owners in the downtown square. These families began worshipping together for several years before opening Temple Israel in 1893. The 128-year-old synagogue remains the place of worship for Springfield’s Jewish community to this day. At the time of its opening, only twenty Jews from Springfield and the surrounding areas worshipped there.

When Jews first immigrated to Missouri, prejudice was much less than was found in many large cities, according to Ioannides. “Small town anti-Semitism tended to be subtle,” [she added]. Because of this subtlety, there has been no documented violence against the Jewish community. But that does not mean they have not faced bigotry.

Why, ask many Israelis, can’t we just end the war, let our children, siblings, and spouses finally come home, and get out the hostages? Azar Gat seeks to answer this question by looking at the possible costs of concluding hostilities precipitously, and breaking down some of the more specific arguments put forward by those who have despaired of continuing military operations in Gaza. He points to the case of the second intifada, in which the IDF not only ended the epidemic of suicide bombing, but effectively convinced—through application of military force—Fatah and other Palestinian factions to cease their terror war.

“What we haven’t achieved militarily in Gaza after a year-and-a-half probably can’t be achieved.” Two years passed from the outbreak of the second intifada until the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, [whose aim was] to reoccupy the West Bank, and another two years until the intifada was fully suppressed. And all of that, then as now, was conducted against the background of a mostly hostile international community and with significant American constraints (together with critical assistance) on Israeli action. The Israeli chief of staff recently estimated that the intensified Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip would take about two months. Let’s hope that is the case.

The results of the [current] operation in [Gaza] and the breaking of Hamas’s grip on the supply routes may indeed pave the way for the entry of a non-Hamas Palestinian administration into the Strip—an arrangement that would necessarily need to be backed by Israeli bayonets, as in the West Bank. Any other end to the war will lead to Hamas’s recovery and its return to control of Gaza.

It is unclear how much Hamas was or would be willing to compromise on these figures in negotiations. But since the hostages are its primary bargaining chip, it has no incentive to compromise. On the contrary—it is interested in dragging out negotiations indefinitely, insisting on the full evacuation of the Gaza Strip and an internationally guaranteed cease-fire, to ensure its survival as Gaza’s de-facto ruler—a position that would also guarantee access to the flood of international aid destined for the Gaza Strip.

Once the hostages become the exclusive focus of discussion, Hamas dictates the rules. And since not only 251 or twenty hostages, but any number is considered worth “any price,” there is a real concern that Hamas will retain a certain number of captives as a long-term reserve.