How Yiddish Became the Language of Political Organizing for Russian Jews

As large numbers of Jews began leaving Russia for the U.S. in the late 1800s, they began to produce pamphlets, newspapers, and books about political organizing in their native Yiddish. Some, seeking to help their coreligionists back home, began to smuggle these works back into Russia, where the government strictly forbade them. As Julia Métraux points out, not all East European Jews spoke Yiddish, and Jewish revolutionaries living under the tsars tended to prefer Russian, but they soon discovered that

there were benefits in organizing in a language that non-Jewish people did not understand.

“Yiddish socialist literature in New York may be considered important in another respect: its sheer availability encouraged Russian Jewish revolutionaries to adopt Yiddish in the first place,” [the Jewish history professor Tony] Michels explains. The growing solidarity among Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe also led to the rise of Bundism, a non-Zionist Jewish [socialist] movement and political party.

New York Jews’ involvement in sending this socialist literature abroad could also be indicative of their later commitment to aiding with both Soviet reconstruction efforts and the resettlement of Russian Jews in the United States.

Read more at JStor Daily

More about: American Jewish History, Bund, Communism, Immigration, Russian Jewry, Yiddish

Hamas’s Confidence Shows Why Hostage Talks Aren’t Working

Sept. 10 2024

Yesterday, President Biden reportedly met with his advisers to discuss how to achieve a breakthrough in hostage negotiations. Meir Ben Shabbat takes a closer look at what the terrorists themselves are saying:

Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s deputy chief in Gaza, reiterated that this issue is merely one of several demands his group has put forward as conditions for a deal. “We stress that any agreement must encompass a full cessation of hostilities, complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing [which allow Hamas to smuggle weapons and supplies from Egypt], unimpeded return of displaced persons to their homes, aid and relief for Palestinians, Gaza’s reconstruction, and a prisoner exchange,” al-Hayya stated.

This stance isn’t new. What stood out in its presentation was the self-assurance displayed by the senior Hamas official, during a week when he and his associates were expected to be on edge, fearing repercussions for the killing of six hostages. However, the reaction to this in Israel and the United States prompted an opposite response from them. From their perspective, not only did they avoid consequences for the heinous act, but through it, they managed to escalate tensions and internal disagreements in Israel, while also prompting Washington to consider presenting a framework defined as a “final offer, without room for negotiation.

Hamas assumes that a final American proposal will inevitably come at Israel’s expense. The primary pressure to reach an agreement is already being applied to Israeli leadership. Hamas faces no consequences for prolonging the process, and so long as it holds hostages, it can always resume negotiations from where they left off.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, U.S. Foreign policy