How Yiddish Became the Language of Political Organizing for Russian Jews

As large numbers of Jews began leaving Russia for the U.S. in the late 1800s, they began to produce pamphlets, newspapers, and books about political organizing in their native Yiddish. Some, seeking to help their coreligionists back home, began to smuggle these works back into Russia, where the government strictly forbade them. As Julia Métraux points out, not all East European Jews spoke Yiddish, and Jewish revolutionaries living under the tsars tended to prefer Russian, but they soon discovered that

there were benefits in organizing in a language that non-Jewish people did not understand.

“Yiddish socialist literature in New York may be considered important in another respect: its sheer availability encouraged Russian Jewish revolutionaries to adopt Yiddish in the first place,” [the Jewish history professor Tony] Michels explains. The growing solidarity among Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe also led to the rise of Bundism, a non-Zionist Jewish [socialist] movement and political party.

New York Jews’ involvement in sending this socialist literature abroad could also be indicative of their later commitment to aiding with both Soviet reconstruction efforts and the resettlement of Russian Jews in the United States.

Read more at JStor Daily

More about: American Jewish History, Bund, Communism, Immigration, Russian Jewry, Yiddish

 

Israel Must Act Swiftly to Defeat Hamas

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli strategy