Fouad Ajami Appreciated the Arab World for Its Achievements, and Held It Responsible for Its Failures

Reviewing the posthumous memoir of the great Lebanese-born scholar Fouad Ajami, Hussain Abdul-Hussain reflects on the similarities between his own life and Ajami’s—both came from Shiite families, both attended the same high school in Beirut (many years apart), and both found their ways to America—and on Ajami’s intellectual legacy:

During our time in our ancestral homeland, we learned the same lesson: Arab failure was from within. It was not the fault of imperialism, colonialism, or even Zionism. For Ajami, the price of dissent was often vilification, in particular the accusation that he was a self-hating Arab.

[Once], I subscribed to Arab nationalism. The late Palestinian-American academic Edward Said was my hero. He taught a generation of scholars that “orientalism”—the patronizing Western belief in Arab inferiority—was the midwife of imperialism and the ultimate author of Middle Eastern misfortunes. Then something unusual happened. The United States prepared to invade Iraq, promising democratic self-government to its people. Meanwhile, Said and an overwhelming majority of Arab intellectuals portrayed Saddam Hussein as a victim of Yankee aggression.

In general, Said and his fellow travelers had few qualms about “armed resistance” to imperial oppressors. They lionized Palestinian resistance above all, yet had sympathy for the dictator who had forced my family out of Iraq. Thus, I saw the ugly face of Arab nationalism. [For his part], Said accused Ajami of having “unmistakably racist prescriptions.”

But neither Ajami nor I were ever self-hating Arabs. Ajami loved Arab culture—the language, poetry, music, and cuisine. . . . In contrast, Edward Said “chose” his Arab identity at age thirty and then made a career out of teaching others to blame foreigners.

Read more at National Interest

More about: Arab World, Edward Said, Fouad Ajami, Iraq war

What’s Behind Hamas’s Threat to Stall the Release of Hostages, and How Israel Should Respond

Feb. 12 2025

Hamas declared yesterday that it won’t release more hostages “until further notice.” Given the timing and wording of the announcement—several days before the release was supposed to take place, and speaking of a delay rather than a halt—Ron Ben-Yishai concludes that it is a negotiating tactic, aimed at “creating a temporary crisis to gain leverage.” Therefore, writes Ben-Yishai, “Hamas may reverse its decision by Saturday.” He adds:

Israel cannot afford to concede to Hamas’s demands beyond what is already outlined in the agreement, as doing so would invite continuous extortion throughout the negotiation process, further delaying hostage releases.

The group sees the public outrage and growing calls for action following the release of hostages in severe medical condition as an opportunity to extract more concessions. These demands include not only a rapid start to negotiations on the next phase of the deal and an end to the war but also smaller, immediate benefits, particularly improved conditions for displaced Gazans.

Beyond these tactical objectives, Hamas has another goal—one that Israelis do not always recognize: inflicting psychological pain on the Israeli public. The group benefits from, and perhaps even draws strength from, the anguish and emotional distress in Israel, as well as the testimonies of freed hostages detailing the abuse they endured. Hamas wants these stories to be heard—not only to pressure the Israeli government but also because, in the eyes of its supporters, Israel’s suffering is its ultimate victory.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security