A Road through Ancient Israel, Built by One of Its Most Notorious Enemies

To Niccolò Machiavelli, Hadrian was one of Rome’s “five good emperors,” who presided over an unrivaled period of prosperity and stability; to Britons, he was the builder of the famous wall that runs the width of England; to Jews, he was the ruler who directed the bloody suppression of the Bar Kokhba revolt in 135 CE and the subsequent persecutions, renamed Jerusalem “Aelia Capitolina” (after himself), and erased Judea from the map—dubbing it Syria Palistaena. He also built one of the ancient Levant’s major thoroughfares, a segment of which was recently excavated. The Times of Israel reports:

Archaeologists have uncovered part of an 1,800-year-old Roman road in northern Israel, built in the time of emperor Hadrian, the Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA) announced.

In a statement, the IAA said the road section, measuring some 8 meters (26 feet) wide and 25 meters (82 feet) long, was found near the village of Rumat al-Heib, some 20 kilometers (12 miles) west of the city of Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee. It was discovered during development work on a walking trail. The IAA branded the road as “the Highway 6 of the ancient world,” referencing Israel’s major north-to-south highway.

It said the road, which runs through Acre, Sepphoris, and Tiberias, was paved in the 2nd century CE during Hadrian’s reign. The road was completed by his successors and later renovated in the Byzantine period. The Roman empire established several major roads in the area as part of a need to quickly move military forces, mail, and goods, the IAA said in its statement Thursday.

Read more at Times of Israel

More about: Ancient Israel, Ancient Rome, Archaeology, Simon bar Kokhba

The Deal with Hamas Involves Painful, but Perhaps Necessary Concessions

Jan. 17 2025

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.

Read more at Free Press

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security