Like several of the ghettos established by the Nazis during World War II, the one in the Polish city of Łódź—which was the longest lived and second-largest—had its own currency. As the ghettos’ ultimate purpose was to exploit the labor of their Jewish residents until the time came for them to be murdered, the German government kept bread rations very low, and saw deaths by starvation as a collateral benefit. The price of foodstuffs in the Łódź ghetto thus soared, creating severe inflation. In fact, high prices are a pervasive theme of residents’ diaries. Joshua Blustein and his colleagues subjected the wealth of data in these diaries to economic analysis in a scholarly article. He discusses their findings, and their relevance for understanding how Jews lived during the Shoah, in conversation with Andrew Jenkins. (Audio, 40 minutes.)

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.