In Magisteria: The Entangled Histories of Science and Religion, Nicholas Spencer examines the interactions between these two realms in the West since the 15th century, highlighting cooperation well as conflict. Jamie Boulding writes in his review:

The book’s [last] three sections are framed by three major incidents in the history of science and religion, which Spencer sees as central to sustaining the popular myth of endless conflict: the Galileo affair, which seemed to pit Copernicus’s heliocentrism against the Catholic Church; the Huxley–Wilberforce debate, which seemed to pit Darwin’s new theory of evolution against Christian belief in Victorian England; and the Scopes “monkey trial,” which seemed to perform a similar role in Tennessee 65 years later.

In each case, Spencer complicates the familiar narrative of scientific advancement sweeping away religious superstition. Galileo’s trial was as much about personality clashes, political considerations, and broader religious upheaval as it was about heliocentrism, which senior Church figures initially received warmly. The Huxley–Wilberforce debate had little public impact until decades later, and it wasn’t narrowly focused on evolution, which Darwin did not in any event view as incompatible with theism. The Scopes trial, according to one of the defense lawyers, was not just about science and religion, but about science and the idiosyncratic populism of William Jennings Bryan, who led the prosecution.

In this sense, Spencer’s book suggests that the supposedly epic clashes between science and religion tell us more about ourselves and our cultural and political battles than they do about scientific inquiry or religious belief. It’s no coincidence that the narrative of conflict between science and religion emerged in the late 19th century just as science was establishing, professionalizing, and seeking cultural territory for itself in Victorian society.

Then and now, the conflict narrative is a function of society’s need to legitimize the status and significance of science. In America today, science (or some version of it) has displaced religion as the approved elite ideology: “In this house, we believe science is real . . . ”.

The negotiations that secured the release of Edan Alexander were conducted by the U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Adam Boehler, with reportedly little or no involvement from the Israelis. Amit Segal considers:

Does Edan’s release mean foreign-passport holders receive priority over those only with Israeli passports? He is, after all, is a dual American-Israeli citizen who grew up in New Jersey. While it may not be the intended message, many will likely interpret the deal as such: foreign-passport holders are worth more. In a country where many citizens are already obtaining second passports, encouraging even more to do so is unwise, to say the least.

Another bad look for Israel: Washington is freeing Edan, not Jerusalem. . . .

Then there’s the question of the Qatari jumbo jet. At this point we can only speculate, but it’s hard to ignore the fact that as Hamas is set to release a hostage, Trump is also accepting a super luxury jumbo jet from Qatar worth around $400 million. Are the two connected?

Still, Segal reminds us that in one, crucial way, this deal is superior to those that preceded it:

The fact that Hamas appears to be freeing a hostage for nothing in return is indeed a victory. Don’t forget: in February, in exchange for the bodies of four hostages, Israel released over 600 Palestinian prisoners, not to mention the Palestinian terrorists—many of whom have Jewish blood on their hands—released in other deals during this war.

As serious as the concerns Segal and others have raised are, that last point makes me think that some of the handwringing about the deal by other commentators is exaggerated. The coming IDF offensive—tanks have been massing on the edge of Gaza in recent days—the many weeks during which supplies haven’t entered the Strip, and Israel’s declared plans not to allow Hamas the ability to distribute humanitarian aid cannot but have made the jihadists more pliable.

And the deal was made on a schedule set by Israel, which said that it would embark on a full-bore offensive at the end of the week if the hostages aren’t released. Moreover, in the parameters Hamas has set forth until now, Alexander, a male soldier, would have been among the last of the hostages to be exchanged.

What of the claim that President Trump has achieved what Prime Minister Netanyahu couldn’t? Again, there is some truth here. But it’s worth noting that the Hostages Forum—a group representing most of the hostages’ families, consistently critical of Netanyahu, and supported by a broad swath of Israelis—has since at least January been demanding a deal where all the hostages are freed at once. (This demand is an understandable reaction to the sadistic games Hamas played with the weekly releases earlier this year and in the fall of 2023.) So Trump let them down too.

In fact, Trump previously promised that “all hell would break loose” if all hostages weren’t released. Neither has happened, so I’m not sure if Trump looks all that much stronger than Netanyahu.

My takeaway, though, isn’t a defense or criticism of either leader, but simply a cautionary note: let’s not jump to conclusions quite yet.