According to reports in Arabic media, IDF units in Rafah reached the Mediterranean coast this weekend, having made their way through this strategically crucial border city. The Jerusalem Post considers Rafah’s long Jewish history:

The Jewish presence in Rafah dates back to the Hasmonean era (167–63 BCE) when King Alexander Yannai of Judea conquered the town. Rafah remained under Jewish control until the Roman general Pompey the Great captured it in 63 BCE. . . . Rafah was noted in significant works such as Strabo’s Geographica and the Oxyrhynchus Papyri during the Roman period, highlighting its prominence in the region.

The Jewish community of Rafah probably reached a high point during the Islamic era, and especially during the 9th and 10th centuries.

Despite facing declines around 1080, when many Jews migrated to Ashkelon, the community experienced a resurgence in the 12th century. Liturgical poems from this time reference the Jewish community in Rafah, although scholarly debates continue regarding the extent and continuity of this presence.

During the medieval period, the Jewish community in Rafah was part of a broader network of Jewish settlements in the region. Notable medieval rabbis, such as Rabbi Tsedakah Halevi, contributed to the community’s spiritual and intellectual life. Historical records from the Cairo Geniza, a trove of Jewish manuscript fragments, provide evidence of correspondence and legal disputes involving the Jewish community in Rafah. Under Ottoman rule, Rafah’s Jewish community engaged in various economic activities, including agriculture and trade.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.