To mark the 30th anniversary of the death of Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the highly influential rebbe of the Lubavitch Hasidim, Tevi Troy recounts his interactions with various American presidents—including a letter to Lyndon Johnson and another from Richard Nixon. One of the defining characteristics of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement under Schneerson’s leadership was its policy of sending emissaries, or shluhim, to college campuses and to remote locations with small Jewish communities. The idea, Troy writes, owes some of its success to President Kennedy:

The rebbe had been sending representatives to Jews in remote locations as far back as 1950, when he sent his first shluhim to Morocco. Yet most Chabad members, often survivors of Hitler and Stalin, understandably wished to calmly settle in the vicinity of Jewish resources like schools, synagogues, and kosher food.

On March 1, 1961, Kennedy issued an executive order creating the Peace Corps, a volunteer service in which Americans would go around the world to help people in developing countries. The next day, March 2, the rebbe told his followers to leave their Brooklyn environs and go help Jews wherever they may be in need. In his speech, the rebbe specifically said that although he had issued a similar call before, now “God is reminding you through the president.”

Jimmy Carter created some permanence to the relationship, establishing an annual Education and Sharing Day in honor of the rebbe. Every president since has signed a statement for that day in honor of the rebbe’s birthday, statements that give insight into how each administration saw how its goals corresponded to the rebbe’s teachings.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.