The book of Kings, describing the glory of King Solomon’s reign, states:

And this is the reason of the levy which king Solomon raised; for to build the house of the Lord, and his own house, and Millo, and the wall of Jerusalem, and Hazor, and Megiddo, and Gezer. For Pharaoh king of Egypt had gone up, and taken Gezer, and burnt it with fire, and slain the Canaanites that dwelt in the city, and given it for a present unto his daughter, Solomon’s wife. And Solomon built Gezer, and lower Beth Horon. . . . And all the cities of store that Solomon had, and cities for his chariots, and cities for his horsemen, and that which Solomon desired to build in Jerusalem, and in Lebanon, and in all the land of his dominion.

Archaeologists are divided about this and similar passages. There is no extrabiblical evidence of Solomon, but the real question for scholars is whether, around the time of David and Solomon, Judean monarchs ruled a large kingdom roughly the size of modern Israel, or just a small chiefdom comprising Jerusalem and surrounding hills. Recent excavations at Gezer, located in the lowlands west of the Judean hill country (known as the Shephelah), support the biblical story of a larger kingdom. Marek Dospel reports, citing the work of the two men who led these excavations:

Steven Ortiz and Samuel Wolff . . . present “new archaeological evidence from Gezer that in the time of Solomon, the city did indeed boast a monumental gate and administrative complex that was meant to convey power and authority over newly acquired territories in the Shephelah.”

“It was during Solomon’s reign, in the mid-10th century BCE, that Gezer underwent a radical change. It became a well-fortified city with a massive six-chambered gate, an adjoining casemate wall, and a large administrative building,” write Ortiz and Wolff. Their excavations “confirm that during the 10th century, Gezer was a fortified city most likely administered by a royal authority.”

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.