On the fast day of Tisha b’Av, which falls this year on August 13, many synagogues will read a medieval elegy for the martyrs of York, who were slaughtered en masse by a Christian mob in 1190. A little more than a century later, on July 18, 1295, the English monarchy expelled Jews completely; they did not return until the 17th century. But, as John Tolan explains in this conversation with Nachi Weinstein, medieval English Jews achieved remarkable economic success, helped finance the building of Oxford University, drank beer with their Gentile neighbors, and even celebrated weddings together—even as patterns of anti-Semitism emerged that would serve as a template for what befell Jews of continental Europe in the following centuries. (Audio, 51 minutes.)

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.