In the 1920s, Joseph Stalin drove his fellow Bolshevik Leon Trotsky out of the inner circle of the Soviet government and then expelled him from the country, eventually having him assassinated in 1940. While Trotsky and Stalin did have genuine ideological disagreements, they agreed that the USSR should be autocratic, brutal, and ruthless toward dissenters. A myth nonetheless grew up that Trotsky embodied a more humane and democratic version of Communism—true only insofar as it’s difficult to be less humane than Stalin—and an energetic Trotskyite movement persisted in the West into the 1950s.

Alan Johnson follows what happened to Trotskyism in the years since and finds an ugly story of people eager to embrace with gusto any brutal dictatorship they could classify as “proletarian” or “anti-imperialist.” The Trotskyite impulse, as one writer described it, was to “act as attorney for some of the vilest regimes in the world.” To Johnson, there is a direct line from that attitude to those leftists today who don’t just defend Hamas, but enthusiastically celebrate the October 7 attacks:

So while the song may remain the same, a lot more people are singing it today. Just as in an earlier era, when the Trotskyists said palpably barbaric anti-working-class tyrannies were really “workers’ states” to be defended unconditionally against “imperialism”; just as when a wider revolutionary New Left said vicious reactionary sub-imperialist predators had really been “anti-imperialists” to be cheered on to victory; so today an even broader “left” is responding to the worst anti-Semitic pogrom since the Holocaust with calls for two, three, many October 7s, which they fantasize will be a global “intifada-revolution.”

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.