Leifer tells a story of a mid-20th zenith of American Jewish flourishing that has now come to an end; in Egypt, the equivalent era of Jewish efflorescence began earlier, and ended far more abruptly. Gavriel Fiske reviews Sacred Places Tell Tales: Jewish Life and Heritage in Modern Cairo, by Yoram Meital, which focuses on that golden era.

During the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Jewish life in Cairo was transformed by an influx of Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern Europe, who were distinct from the local Mizrahi and Karaite Jews. During the same period, new neighborhoods were being built, enabling Jews for the first time to set up new centers and synagogues beyond the confines of ancient Cairo.

The Sephardi community, whose members spoke both French and Arabic, was run by close-knit families of “Jewish tycoons,” who were “pioneers in establishing modern Egyptian industry and agriculture. [They were] very rich. They ran a significant part of the Egyptian economy,” Meital said, though he stressed that the Sephardi community had a range of socioeconomic levels. These wealthy families were also involved in the economy of Ottoman (and then British Mandate) Palestine, buying properties and sending donations to Jewish concerns there.

Egypt turned sharply against its Jews in 1948, and the 1950s and 1960s saw persecution of those who hadn’t fled.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.