The Golden Age of Egyptian Jewry

Sept. 9 2024

Leifer tells a story of a mid-20th zenith of American Jewish flourishing that has now come to an end; in Egypt, the equivalent era of Jewish efflorescence began earlier, and ended far more abruptly. Gavriel Fiske reviews Sacred Places Tell Tales: Jewish Life and Heritage in Modern Cairo, by Yoram Meital, which focuses on that golden era.

During the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Jewish life in Cairo was transformed by an influx of Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern Europe, who were distinct from the local Mizrahi and Karaite Jews. During the same period, new neighborhoods were being built, enabling Jews for the first time to set up new centers and synagogues beyond the confines of ancient Cairo.

The Sephardi community, whose members spoke both French and Arabic, was run by close-knit families of “Jewish tycoons,” who were “pioneers in establishing modern Egyptian industry and agriculture. [They were] very rich. They ran a significant part of the Egyptian economy,” Meital said, though he stressed that the Sephardi community had a range of socioeconomic levels. These wealthy families were also involved in the economy of Ottoman (and then British Mandate) Palestine, buying properties and sending donations to Jewish concerns there.

Egypt turned sharply against its Jews in 1948, and the 1950s and 1960s saw persecution of those who hadn’t fled.

Read more at Times of Israel

More about: Anti-Semitism, Egypt, North African Jewry

The U.S. Has Finally Turned Up the Heat on the Houthis—but Will It Be Enough?

March 17 2025

Last Tuesday, the Houthis—the faction now ruling much of Yemen—said that they intend to renew attacks on international shipping through the Red and Arabian Seas. They had for the most part paused their attacks following the January 19 Israel-Hamas cease-fire, but their presence has continued to scare away maritime traffic near the Yemeni coast, with terrible consequences for the global economy.

The U.S. responded on Saturday by initiating strikes on Houthi missile depots, command-and-control centers, and propaganda outlets, and has promised that the attacks will continue for days, if not weeks. The Houthis responded by launching drones, and possibly missiles, at American naval ships, apparently without result. Another missile fired from Yemen struck the Sinai, but was likely aimed at Israel. As Ari Heistein has written in Mosaic, it may take a sustained and concerted effort to stop the Houthis, who have high tolerance for casualties—but this is a start. Ron Ben-Yishai provides some context:

The goal is to punish the Houthis for directly targeting Western naval vessels in the Red Sea while also exerting indirect pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. . . . While the Biden administration did conduct airstrikes against the Houthis, it refrained from a proactive military campaign, fearing a wider regional war. However, following the collapse of Iran’s axis—including Hizballah’s heavy losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—the Trump administration appears unafraid of such an escalation.

Iran, the thinking goes, will also get the message that the U.S. isn’t afraid to use force, or risk the consequences of retaliation—and will keep this in mind as it considers negotiations over its nuclear program. Tamir Hayman adds:

The Houthis are the last proxy of the Shiite axis that have neither reassessed their actions nor restrained their weapons. Throughout the campaign against the Yemenite terrorist organization, the U.S.-led coalition has made operational mistakes: Houthi regime infrastructure was not targeted; the organization’s leaders were not eliminated; no sustained operational continuity was maintained—only actions to remove immediate threats; no ground operations took place, not even special-forces missions; and Iran has not paid a price for its proxy’s actions.

But if this does not stop the Houthis, it will project weakness—not just toward Hamas but primarily toward Iran—and Trump’s power diplomacy will be seen as hollow. The true test is one of output, not input. The only question that matters is not how many strikes the U.S. carries out, but whether the Red Sea reopens to all vessels. We will wait and see—for now, things look brighter than they did before.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Donald Trump, Houthis, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen