In the past two weeks, there have been some attention-grabbing, even sensationalist headlines about new discoveries regarding the 1st-century Roman siege of Masada, the final redoubt of a group of Jewish rebels. The original journal article, by Hai Ashkenazi, Omer Ze’evi-Berger, Boaz Gross, and Guy D. Stiebel is fortunately freely available to the public, and its more modest conclusions are still fascinating. While most previous research has focused on the fortress of Masada itself, these researchers examined the battlements constructed by the Romans:

During the battle over Masada, the Roman army built an extensive siege system around the fortress. This system included eight army camps, a siege wall (circumvallation), and a large ramp approaching the fortress’s wall. In addition, they either built or re-used a network of trails connecting the Judean plateau and the eastern plain. The dry desert environment and the remote location allowed for the superb preservation of this system; today, it is easy to identify its various architectonic features, from camp walls to tent bases, gates, towers, and a possible water cistern. Even the wood used for the construction of the siege ramp is still intact.

Using computer imaging alongside the results of their excavations, the researchers conclude that the entire siege system was constructed by 5,000 men in a period of about two weeks. In their view, their findings support the longstanding hypothesis that the siege only lasted between four and nine weeks—much shorter than what is suggested by the account of Flavius Josephus. The claim that the siege was much shorter than generally thought inspired the excited headlines.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.