Saul Bellow’s Israel, and Its Unchanged Enemies

March 18 2025

In 1975, the American Jewish novelist Saul Bellow took a trip to Israel. The result was To Jerusalem and Back, his only book-length work of nonfiction. Elliot Kaufman revisits Bellow’s “deep and reflective, pragmatic and piercing,” reflections on the Jewish state:

“Here in Jerusalem,” writes Bellow, “when you shut your apartment door behind you, you fall into a gale of conversation—exposition, argument, harangue, analysis, theory, expostulation, threat, and prophecy.” Everyone is a diplomat, but no one will be diplomatic. “The subject of all this talk is, ultimately, survival,” Bellow writes, “the survival of the decent society created in Israel within a few decades. At first this is hard to grasp because the setting is so civilized.”

So fascinating are the Israeli characters we meet and so urgent are the ideas they thrash about in Bellow’s quick tableaus, that even the reflective interludes among civilizational treasures can seem almost prelapsarian and out of place. Bellow felt some of this himself: “In these days of armored attacks on Yom Kippur, of Vietnams, Watergates, Mansons, Amins, terrorist massacres at Olympic Games, what are illuminated manuscripts, what are masterpieces of wrought iron, what are holy places?”

Bellow is more comfortable letting others prosecute the case against the Arabs. Where he must speak in his own words is against their apologists in the West. The French are the worst. “Since 1973, Le Monde has openly taken the side of the Arabs in their struggle with Israel,” he writes. “It supports terrorists. It is friendlier to [Idi] Amin than to Rabin. A recent review of the autobiography of a fedayeen speaks of the Israelis as colonialist.” One is surprised again and again how little has changed in 50 years.

Read more at Jewish Review of Books

More about: American Jewish literature, Israeli history, Saul Bellow

 

Israel Must Act Swiftly to Defeat Hamas

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli strategy