In May 1934, the Nazi newspaper Der Stürmer published an exhaustive list of invented Jewish acts of ritual murder, three of which seem to be taken from a single account by the 5th-century historian Socrates of Constantinople (a/k/a Socrates Scholasticus). Socrates’ story of a group of Jews crucifying a Christian boy has recently found its way onto social media, Substack, and some extremist websites. Rebecca Stephens Falcasantos explains what is known about this highly dubious tale:

Socrates of Constantinople (ca. 380–ca. 450), about whom we know little, compiled his seven-volume Ecclesiastical History sometime between 439 and 445 CE.

Tucked into his history is a brief account of violence that broke out between Jews and Christians in Immonmestar (frequently rendered Inmestar), an obscure town in Roman Syria, located between Chalcis and Antioch. . . . Socrates’ report about the crucifixion that allegedly happened at Immonmestar is but one thread entangled within a larger tapestry of polemic, where the persistence of Jewish festivals ensnare the weak-minded and lurk underneath the errors of heretics. While the reported crucifixion—like other episodes involving Jews in Socrates’ History—implicates Jews, the history is not ultimately about Jews, but rather about being the right type of Christian.

By the early 18th century, however, it was becoming a standard passage requiring mention. . . . Perhaps most notable and influential is Jacques Basnage’s Histoire et la religion des Juifs depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu’à present. Basnage offers the Inmestar crucifixion as evidence of the need for kings to “restrain these excesses [of the dominant religion]; and to cherish the public peace, by punishing a cruel zeal.”

Other scholars, however, cited Socrates’ narrative for more explicitly anti-Jewish ends. For example, Johann Andreas Eisenmenger’s Entdecktes Judenthum (Judaism Revealed; 1711) includes the Inmestar affair, which he dates to 419, in list of murders that he alleges were committed by Jews.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.