Recently, Harvard University made news when librarians realized that what they thought was an ordinary copy of the Magna Carta was in fact an original, handwritten in 1300 when King Edward reissued the document. The original Magna Carta was promulgated in 1215 by King John to appease rebellious nobles, and its primary function was to impose limits on the powers of the crown. Yvette Alt Miller points out that part of the text deals explicitly with Jews, who, in England, were directly under the jurisdiction of the king:

One key way to limit the king’s power was to weaken his Jewish moneylenders. Two clauses in the Magna Carta are devoted to rigging the moneylending system to harm England’s Jews—and thus indirectly, the king.

Clause 10 limits the amount of interest Jewish businessmen could collect from the estate of a borrower who passed away: “If anyone who has borrowed a sum of money from Jews dies before the debt has been repaid, his heir shall pay no interest on the debt for so long as he remains under age.”

Clause 11 placed even greater limits on money lenders’ ability to collect debts from a deceased borrower’s heirs: “If a man dies owing money to Jews, his wife may have her dowry (back) and pay nothing towards the debt from it. If he leaves children that are under age, their needs may also be approved for on a scale appropriate to the size of his holding of lands. The debt is to be paid out of the residue (only).”

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”