Two weeks ago, this newsletter included an item about a fresh analysis—employing a machine-learning tool whimsically named Enoch—that concluded that the Dead Sea Scrolls are somewhat older than previously thought. Nathan Steinmeyer provides some more detail on the study, and also cites some of the scholars who are skeptical:

“The results of this study are very interesting, and presumably important, but not earth-shattering,” Christopher Rollston, a professor of biblical and Near Eastern languages at George Washington University, told Bible History Daily. “Most of the conclusions of the study dovetail with what the great paleographers in the field, such as the late Frank Moore Cross, had already stated more than 60 years ago.”

Rollston, one of the field’s most highly regarded experts, also contested some of Enoch’s conclusions about specific texts, including manuscripts of the book of Daniel.

Responding to Rollston’s comments, James Davila (a scholar whose work I often turn to when trying to make sense of the latest discoveries about ancient Israel), raises an important, more general point about dating scriptural texts:

[T]he fact that the book of Daniel refers to supposedly future events does not prove that it was written after those events. It says [that Daniel’s prophecy] was a miracle. Arguments that miracles can’t happen always involve circular reasoning. And there’s nothing in the laws of physics that precludes transmission of information from the future to the past. We just don’t know how to do it.

I agree that Daniel was written after most of its predicted events—because at a certain point the supposed predictions go wildly wrong, as predictions of the future generally do. . . . But I like to keep my metaphysical house in order. Ideological materialism need not be mistaken for objectivity.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.