Azerbaijan: Israel’s Most Important Muslim Ally

Although Azerbaijan, a Shiite-majority nation in the Caucasus, does not maintain an embassy in Israel, it has a strong alliance with the Jewish state, importing Israeli military technology and exporting oil. Israel also seems to use Azerbaijan for intelligence-gathering, in exchange for advice and training for the Azeri military. But the relationship runs deeper than that, as Gallia Lindenstrauss writes, as the two countries share an enduring interest in checking Iranian aggression:

[D]uring the [1991-1994 Armenian-Azerbaijani] war over Nagorno-Karabakh and the nearby areas, Iran was (and still is) an ally of Armenia. Another source of dispute between Azerbaijan and Iran is the division of natural resources in the Caspian Sea, and in addition the Azerbaijanis accuse Iran of encouraging a religious revival among their Shiite population. . . .

While many countries perceive Iran, and especially its nuclear program, as a threat, most do not regard it as an existential threat; the few countries that do, include both Israel and Azerbaijan. . . . [I]n many respects, Azerbaijan is irreplaceable for Israel, and the proximity of this country to Iran makes it especially attractive.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel & Zionism, Israel diplomacy, Shiites

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF