The wisdom of numerous pundits states that the upcoming Israeli elections are a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu. Not so, writes Elliott Abrams; they are a referendum on his chief rival.

Netanyahu has served as prime minister for ten years and been in politics for decades. He is a known quantity, and his poll numbers are not good. As Tony Blair and Margaret Thatcher found out, ten years is a long time, and one builds up critics, opponents, and enemies. The public gets tired. There are almost inevitably scandals. A December survey “asked respondents whether they want Netanyahu to remain prime minister after the vote. Sixty percent said no.”

So why does this not mean that Netanyahu is done for, and that Isaac (“Buji”) Herzog will be the next PM? Because Israeli voters do not trust him—yet. Recent polls have shown that between 18 and 24 percent of Israelis are undecided—the swing voters who will decide the election. Though Herzog is fifty-four years old, is the son of Israel’s sixth president, has been in the Knesset since 2003, and has served as a cabinet minister several times, he’s not a well-known quantity. He has led his Labor party only since November 2013. One year ago, a third of Israeli voters knew little about him, and even now 20 percent “say they don’t have an opinion of him or have never heard of him,” according to the Times of Israel. That number will continue to decline as the election nears, but it is amazingly high for the man leading the main opposition party.

Israel is beset with security challenges: Iran and Hizballah have troops fighting in Syria, Islamic State spreads nearby, Iran’s nuclear-weapons program is advancing, Hamas runs Gaza, and of course the administration in Washington is hostile to Israel while accommodating to Iran. For undecided Israeli voters the question is not “do I love Bibi,” it is “can I trust Buji to protect this country?”

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.