Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral victory has prompted much talk of American Jews feeling themselves increasingly “distant” from Israel. Some of this talk takes the form of loosely (or not-so-loosely) veiled threats: if Israelis don’t start voting the way American Jews supposedly want them too, they will lose American-Jewish support. Shmuel Rosner contends that this talk is based on faulty assumptions:

[W]hy blame Israel and its decisions for the phenomenon of “distancing”? Why presuppose that it is the Israeli voters that need to change their outlook to win favor with American Jews—and not conclude that it is American Jews that need to change their outlook to win favor with Israeli Jews?

The threat of “distancing from Israel” is based on two faulty pillars: that politics is a main driver of connection and disconnection to Israel [and] that Israel needs American Jews more than they need Israel. . . .

I don’t accept these assumptions—because they are unproven and untrue. Unproven because, as we’ve seen in many studies in recent years, the political divide is not the main driver that determines the connection of Jews to Israel. Of course, this might change, but thus far it has not. Untrue, because American Jews need the connection to Israel no less than Israel needs this connection.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.