Caroline Glick argues that, in his next term, Benjamin Netanyahu should work to curb anti-democratic forces in Israel. A beginning move would expand freedom of the press by striking back against a recent attempt by left-leaning legislators to outlaw the right-leaning newspaper Israel Hayom:

The government should act as quickly as possible to open the television and radio waves to market forces. Everyone with the financial wherewithal should have the right to buy and operate a radio or television station. To achieve this, the government needs to take two steps.

First, it needs to end all restrictions on content in television and radio broadcasting aside from provisions barring the airing of pornography and other social ills. Second, it needs to make media licensing conditional on the licensee’s prior agreement to broadcast IDF messages during states of emergency. . . .

The Israel Hayom draft law was a threat to Israeli democracy. And the threat would have been carried out if the election results had been different. To ensure that we don’t face a similar threat in the future, we need a media market full of different voices saying different things, competing for our attention. As long as Israel Hayom remains the only mass-media organ with a unique voice, it will remain under threat from the forces that prefer unanimity to variety in our public discourse.

Next, writes Glick, for practical reasons the prime minister should reconsider the bill declaring Israel “the nation-state of the Jewish people,” and instead focus on procedural reforms that will more effectively solve the problems the bill was intended to address:

Although the next Knesset will have the votes to pass the nation-state bill, there is no pressing need to do so. . . . The reason it doesn’t matter one way or another is that he legislation is redundant. Its central components, those that define Israel as the Jewish state, are already anchored in standing law. . . .

The left opposed the [nation-state bill] because its leaders feared the law would weaken the Supreme Court. . . . The problem with this view—shared by the bill’s right-wing proponents and its left-wing opponents—is that . . . Supreme Court justices have no compunction about ignoring the explicit language of standing laws, including Basic Laws with quasi-constitutional weight. . . .

It is impossible to reform the legal system by passing laws that justices and governmental legal advisers will ignore. The only way to reform the legal system and so strengthen Israeli democracy is to take direct steps to curb the anti-democratic powers that the legal fraternity, led by the court, has arrogated.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.