Examining last summer’s war between Israel and Hamas, Efraim Inbar concludes that “it is clear that Hamas lost.” About whether the terror group was sufficiently deterred from launching future wars, he is less certain:
The government of Israel demonstrated caution in avoiding the use of massive force, which is commendable in a democracy that cares for the wellbeing of its citizens and soldiers. . . . However, it remains to be seen whether such conduct eroded Israeli deterrence by delivering a message of weakness and hesitancy, as the readiness to fight, determination, and uncompromising courage are the building stones of deterrence. . . .
Restrictions placed on the IDF for fear of international public reaction, such as avoidance of extensive targeting of multi-story buildings and mosques that served as Hamas strategic facilities and launching pads, may be read as weakness and impair deterrence. Perhaps escalation should have begun earlier in the war. On the other hand, Israel’s ability to target the heads of Hamas’s military branch, the severe level of destruction in parts of Gaza, and the IDF’s capacity to collect real-time intelligence and attack swiftly, may contribute to deterrence. But leaving Hamas in control of Gaza conflicts with the aim of creating long-term deterrence. In light of all this, the contribution of the 2014 offensive to Israeli deterrence is inconclusive.
Read more on Middle East Quarterly: http://www.meforum.org/5080/did-israel-weaken-hamas