Last week, BBC Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen conducted an interview with Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas. What ensued was an exercise in propaganda, not only licensed but amplified by the interviewer himself. Alan Johnson writes:

Bowen . . . allowed Meshal, an anti-Semitic terrorist who has exulted in the killing of Jews as Jews, to preen and pose, without challenge, before a global audience—with the full imprimatur of a respectful BBC—as a heroic Palestinian democrat, a moderate man, a peacemaker, and a reluctant liberator in the glorious tradition of Nelson Mandela and George Washington.

Bowen even allowed an incitement to go unchallenged. “Netanyahu likes to shed blood,” spat Meshal—an old image about Jews-with-power that has a certain, ahem, history. Bowen didn’t blink. . . . Bowen [also] allowed Meshal to claim that Hamas was not Islamist. . . .

Bowen didn’t just leave Hamas spin unchallenged. He actually spun for Hamas himself. “Mr. Meshal said he and the group had agreed to accept the boundaries which existed before the 1967 Middle East war as the basis for those of a future Palestinian state,” wrote Bowen. But that is just not true. It is, to be frank, Hamas propaganda.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.