The Many Layers of South African Hypocrisy on the International Criminal Court

South Africa recently declined an opportunity to execute a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Omar al-Bashir, the genocidal president of Sudan. Eugene Kontorovich notes the many layers of hypocrisy at play here:

[F]ew other countries reflect the Palestinians’ warped view of international law as [does] South Africa. It has become one of the Jewish state’s most vocal critics, always couching its criticisms in language of law and rights, while embracing monsters like Robert Mugabe, the scourge-for-life of neighboring Zimbabwe. One cannot help being struck by the number of South Africans, especially jurists, at the forefront of international legal efforts against Israel (especially at the UN), including [those] seeking prosecutions at the ICC—Richard Goldstone, John Dugard, Navi Pillay, Desmond Tutu. . . .

So it’s easier for a crate of Jordan Valley dates to get served with process for war crimes in South Africa than the perpetrator of one of the world’s greatest genocides. . . .

Ironically, Bashir’s impunity may only push the ICC to take a harder line on Israel. One would think that genocide . . . would generate enough international consensus and pressure for its prosecution to get a fugitive arrested. . . . But apparently genocide is not enough. So the ICC prosecutor will cast about for a role that will make the court generally useful and appreciated by the international community, [by seeking] out the lowest common denominator of international demand for prosecution. And that’s not prosecution for genocide, but for houses for Jews in Jerusalem. Even the Palestinian Authority and South Africa can get behind that.

Read more at Washington Post

More about: Anti-Semitism, Genocide, ICC, Israel & Zionism, South Africa, Sudan


Why Egypt Fears an Israeli Victory in Gaza

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.

Read more at Washington Examiner

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023, U.S. Foreign policy