While many Druze in Israel have called on the government to aid their coreligionists in Syria, a number of prominent Syrian Druze have rejected Israeli assistance and urged continued support for the Assad regime. Mordechai Kedar explains a highly complex situation:

[B]ehind the scenes a great drama is taking place, with the added presence of Jordan and the United States, as all those involved know exactly what may be the fate of the Druze when Assad falls. . . . [Yet] the Druze are not sure Assad will indeed fall, and perhaps they still hope the Iranians will invade Syria in order to save Assad and end the rebellion against him. It also stands to reason that the [statement rejecting Israel’s help] does not represent all the Druze, some of whom certainly do not support what it says.

The Druze position is terribly complicated. They are torn between conflicting loyalties, afraid of all the protagonists in the [Syrian civil war] because they are not Muslims and because they are concentrated in three areas that can easily be surrounded and cut off. Willingness to accept aid from Israel will leave them open to the revenge of the [Assad] regime and the jihadists; refusal may leave them unprotected. They do not have a unified leadership capable of presenting a single stand, and it is hard to believe media pronouncements made by one leader or another.

The main goal of the Druze is to survive, as they have for 1,000 years in a hostile Muslim environment, but the question is how they are to go about it and what steps they should take to ensure that survival. The answers offered to those questions contradict one another, and we can only hope that the complex situation of the Druze and the division in their ranks will not lead this remarkable ethnic group to the jihadist knives and slave-markets of Islamic State.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.