The United Church of Christ (UCC) is about to hold its General Synod, where its leaders will consider no fewer than three resolutions condemning Israel and endorsing BDS. Jonathan Marks looks into the sources informing these resolutions:

[A]s the Presbyterian Church (USA) has its Israel-Palestine Mission Network driving its anti-Israel activities, so the UCC has its Palestine/Israel Network, and its page is, or should be, an embarrassment to everyone involved in the UCC. Consider what the Network considers a trustworthy source on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We get, among other things, an article from Countercurrents on “How U.S. Tax Breaks Fund Israeli Settlers.” Countercurrents has also published the authoritative “Why the World Should Not Be Controlled by the Zionist Jews,” which begins: “the geopolitical situation demands that the world must confront Jews, particularly the ones who hold absolute sway over arms sale [sic], media, and the Zionists.” . . .

The site also links not once, not twice, but three times, to Counterpunch, a journal with its own issues with anti-Semitism. Although the divestment resolutions both refer to the UCC’s 2001 resolution confessing to the sin of anti-Semitism and denouncing it, the . . . primary movers [of divestment] appear not to have let that affect their reading habits. . . .

The gang that produced this helpful guide to educating oneself on the [Israel-Palestinian] conflict is the gang that has been engaged in educating the UCC on the issue. I’d like to say that the Church will notice the stench. But as the Presbyterian Church showed, many mainline Protestant leaders do not have strong senses of smell when it comes to anti-Semitism.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”