In 2014, despite the overall failure of its tactics, Hamas showed that its leaders had learned important lessons from previous conflicts with Israel. The IDF, writes Mitch Ginsburg, must adjust its own tactics to keep up:
[Since] the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 peaked with the deportation of Yasir Arafat and the PLO to Tunis, Israel’s sub-state enemies have adhered to the doctrine of “victory through non-defeat.” In other words: continue firing rockets and make sure you aren’t cornered and deported and you may declare victory. This was the case in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2009.
Part of the rationale was the assumption that Israel’s citizens are soft-spined bons vivants who will pressure their leadership to make concessions in order to stop the fire. That backfired [last] summer. On the contrary, Hamas saw that the longer the duration of the war, the more assets it lost. . . .
[However], the large tunnel attack that was thwarted at the start of the [2014] war is indicative of a doctrinal shift toward offensive action and initiative rather than responsive attacks. The implications of this shift are considerable. Israel, for instance, will have to take into account a Hamas offensive that aims to push the fighting into Israel before Israel has so much as inserted troops into Gaza.
Read more on Times of Israel: http://www.timesofisrael.com/a-year-on-army-looks-to-last-gaza-war-for-lessons-on-fighting-the-next-one/