Earlier this month, the IDF took the unprecedented step of releasing a document outlining its updated strategic doctrines. Gabi Siboni explains why the report and its content matter:

The publication of The IDF Strategy [is in itself] a milestone in the relationship between the military and the civilian populations, and it is impossible to overstate the importance of the transparency manifested by the very publication of the document. . . .

In the most recent campaigns in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2009, 2011, 2014), the IDF took action according to the “erosion” principle: even if not articulated explicitly, the IDF used the idea of reducing the enemy’s force as its guiding principle. Thus, the IDF used increasingly larger amounts of firepower to target the enemy’s capabilities and operational infrastructures. This principle took a toll on the Israeli home front, manifested in an extended combat period, during which the enemy continued to maintain its ability to fire rockets and missiles. The enemy, unconcerned about its own survival, could remain impervious to the scope of the destruction and damage wrought by the IDF.

The new IDF document presents an essentially different approach to action: in response to provocations, the IDF will attack the enemy using integrated capabilities, immediately and simultaneously. The ground maneuver is given importance in its updated role, which is to penetrate enemy territory rapidly in order to damage the survivability of the enemy’s governing bodies and destroy its military infrastructures. . . . These actions will be supported by special operations, cyber operations, high-quality intelligence, and the most effective defenses possible against enemy fire.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.