How Did Jerusalem React to the Death of Egypt’s President Nasser?

Monday marks the 45th anniversary of the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, arch-foe of the state of Israel. Herewith, a summary of Israeli government reactions, based on declassified documents and reports in the contemporary press:

[At a cabinet meeting the day after Nasser’s death], Prime Minister Golda Meir . . . reported that President Zalman Shazar wanted to make a radio statement on Nasser’s death. The tourism minister, Moshe Kol, said there was no reason for generosity toward Nasser: his policies were a failure and, while driving out the British and the French, he had let in the Russians. Nasser could have been a great leader, [said Kol], but had wasted his efforts on trying to destroy Israel. However, a new ruler in Egypt might take a different line, and Kol agreed with [Moshe] Dayan that Israel should take the initiative.

Several ministers favored an official statement by Shazar or Golda, but the interior minister, Yosef Burg, said they should approach the question “without malice and without hypocrisy.” Surely, [argued Burg], the Jewish community of Shushan would not have sent a telegram of sympathy to the family of Haman (who had plotted to destroy the Jews).

Read more at Israel's Documented Story

More about: Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Golda Meir, History & Ideas, Israel & Zionism, Zalman Shazar

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF