The imminent coincidence of Yom Kippur and the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha is expected to exacerbate the situation on the Temple Mount, where there have been multiple riots in recent weeks and spreading violence elsewhere in Jerusalem. Kobi Michael and Oded Eran suggest what Israel might do to prevent a major outbreak of violence:

The crisis, [which has been going on] for several months already, . . . requires the design of an overall strategy, not merely putting out fires as they occur. . . . The stabilization efforts should include stepped-up police presence and law enforcement, and legislative changes to enact more severe punishment [for rioters]. These should be combined with efforts to temper the behavior of Jewish provocateurs, and diplomatic and public-relations efforts to expose the true nature of the events on the Temple Mount to the international community, with an emphasis on the riots and violent confrontations [orchestrated] by Palestinian groups.

Concurrently, Israel should try to refashion the existing situation on the Temple Mount with a focus on excluding inciters, headed by Hamas and the northern faction of the Islamic Movement, while reinforcing the presence and influence of the Jordanian Waqf on the site. This would help preempt a possible maneuver in Abbas’s expected appearance before the UN General Assembly in late September that harps on the issue of Jerusalem as a convenient tool for the purpose of delegitimizing Israel in the international community.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.