Islamists, Pinhas Inbari explains, are deeply divided over the religious status of the al-Aqsa mosque and of Jerusalem in general. While the Muslim Brotherhood (of which Hamas is an offshoot) sees Jerusalem as its symbolic religious center and the mosque as itself holy, Salafists like Islamic State and al-Qaeda suspect the holiness of any site outside of Mecca and Medina and have downplayed the importance of Jerusalem. Further differences divide Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and divide Palestinians among themselves:

One reason for the Muslim Brotherhood’s pronounced emphasis on the al-Aqsa issue is political. They want to unify all the Arab revolutions in all the separate Arab countries into one great revolution under the flag of saving al-Aqsa. . . . Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, for their part, regard this as a political danger and hence do not support the Palestinians’ struggle to entrench their status in Jerusalem; they see the emphasis on Jerusalem as working against them. . . .

In seeking to maintain its status in Jerusalem, the Palestinian Authority came up with the idea of “religious tourism” to the city. The aim is to flood it with Muslim tourists, who would strengthen its Muslim character and thereby counteract the [supposed] “Judaization” trend in the city. The Muslim Brotherhood harshly condemned this initiative, calling it “normalization.” In their view, inundating the city with tourists sharply contradicts the slogans about battle and warfare to liberate al-Aqsa, with which they hope to unite the whole world of Islam under their flag. . . .

The dominant force in the mosque compound is Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation party). Deployed worldwide, Hizb ut-Tahrir has adopted the exclusive goal of promoting the idea of the Islamic caliphate and does not hide its intention to proclaim the caliphate from al-Aqsa. Thus, the movement clashes with the PLO on the one hand, as in the ousting of the senior Palestinian official, and with Hamas on the other, but first and foremost with Jordan [which currently has custodianship of the mosque].

Only Israel, Inbari concludes, can be counted on to keep a lid on the intra-Muslim conflicts, and is able to prevent Salafists from taking over and destroying al-Aqsa as they have other Muslim holy places in Syria and Iraq.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”