Lessons of the Gaza Disengagement

Taking into account some key events in the decade since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Yossi Kuperwasser draws several conclusions:

First, the Palestinian Authority is not capable of controlling a territory on its own. . . .

[Furthermore], unilateral concessions [by Israel] are perceived in the region as signs of weakness, and hence invite additional pressure. Conversely, demonstrating resolve discourages pressure. The unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon [in 2000] encouraged the Palestinians to choose confrontation and launch the second intifada. The disengagement [from Gaza] convinced the extremist elements among the Palestinians, along with Hizballah, to continue the armed struggle, including a focus on kidnappings [which eventually led to the 2006 Lebanon war]. . . .

[Finally], the political benefit from unilateral concessions is temporary and illusory. It is not possible to translate such concessions into sustainable political achievements. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was not acknowledged as the end of an occupation. . . . The campaign of delegitimization against Israel continued.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

More about: Ariel Sharon, Gaza Strip, Hizballah, Israel & Zionism, Palestinian Authority, Second Intifada, Second Lebanon War

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF