The European Union, beset by severe fiscal problems and the mass influx of migrants, and faced with rising anti-EU sentiment in the UK, Poland, and elsewhere, no longer seems to have a certain future. Israeli policymakers, writes Manfred Gerstenfeld, must consider the possible effects of its demise or transformation:

A total break-up of the EU has both advantages and disadvantages for Israel. Rather than dealing with the EU, nominally representing 500 million citizens, Israel would then have to deal with many smaller countries. This may be beneficial when such countries attempt to meddle in Israel’s internal policies, [since they would no longer have] the power of a supranational body behind them.

However, if the EU does disintegrate completely, countries such as Sweden—which is ruled by an anti-Israel government dominated by social democrats—may embark on more extreme policies toward Israel when not bound within the EU to seek compromise. Although the absence of an EU may make it easier to face off against the Swedes, very undesirable precedents may be created.

In the light of all this a shrinking of the EU’s power and competencies without an actual breakup would probably be best for Israel.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”