Last week, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox leaders, together with the Israeli government, reached a compromise—years in the making—over the ever-controversial issue of non-Orthodox prayer at the Western Wall. The agreement, authorizing the expansion of the space allocated to non-Orthodox prayer, is a significant achievement, argues Ben Sales, though it has yet to be turned into a reality:

What’s historic here are not the particulars of the deal but the fact that it was made [at all]. For nearly three decades, a coalition of women’s-rights advocates and non-Orthodox Jews waged a fight against Israel’s Orthodox establishment. Now, the sides have signed a peace treaty—with the government’s imprimatur. Save for a breakaway faction of Women of the Wall, every party involved has endorsed this deal.

When it comes to [questions of] religion and state [in Israel], that’s really rare. No recent religious legislation—from the expansion of military conscription to 2014’s failed conversion reform—achieved this level of consensus.

But the agreement won’t mean much until it’s implemented, which is why I’ll [only] believe in the expansion when I see it.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.