Why the Western Wall Compromise Matters—If It’s Implemented

Last week, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox leaders, together with the Israeli government, reached a compromise—years in the making—over the ever-controversial issue of non-Orthodox prayer at the Western Wall. The agreement, authorizing the expansion of the space allocated to non-Orthodox prayer, is a significant achievement, argues Ben Sales, though it has yet to be turned into a reality:

What’s historic here are not the particulars of the deal but the fact that it was made [at all]. For nearly three decades, a coalition of women’s-rights advocates and non-Orthodox Jews waged a fight against Israel’s Orthodox establishment. Now, the sides have signed a peace treaty—with the government’s imprimatur. Save for a breakaway faction of Women of the Wall, every party involved has endorsed this deal.

When it comes to [questions of] religion and state [in Israel], that’s really rare. No recent religious legislation—from the expansion of military conscription to 2014’s failed conversion reform—achieved this level of consensus.

But the agreement won’t mean much until it’s implemented, which is why I’ll [only] believe in the expansion when I see it.

Read more at JTA

More about: Israel & Zionism, Judaism in Israel, Religion and politics, Western Wall, Women of the Wall

 

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security