In a remarkably frank interview with Ariel Kahane, Eran Lerman, a veteran of Israeli military intelligence who served on the country’s National Security Council from 2009 to 2015, discusses his experiences and sheds light on some of the Netanyahu government’s most significant decisions. Responding to the accusation that the prime minister is a “passive” leader who reacts without taking initiative, and is thus leading Israel “into a dead end,” Lerman comments:

It’s not true that Netanyahu is leading [Israel] into a dead end. Our situation is good. We are under threat, and we need to be careful, to maneuver, to act wisely, and to invest far greater efforts and resources into foreign policy than the Ministry of Finance currently allows. We’re not immune to harm, but hard work brings results. . . .

As for the claim about passivity, as far as I’m concerned, that’s a compliment. Grandiose attempts like the first Lebanon war and the Oslo Accords, which sought to redesign the Middle East and everything around it, [have failed]. Give me nine years of Yitzḥak Shamir [against whom similar accusations were made] in exchange for those two adventures. I think Shamir was given a country in a very problematic situation, and handed it over to Rabin in excellent condition. We don’t know how history will judge the current prime minister, but if it weighs factors such as the economic situation, the depth of relations with important countries around the world, and so on, then the data are good. . . .

Today Hamas is much worse off than it was in the past. It’s true that they are preparing for the next war, and there’s no reason the think they won’t start one, but the fact that Hamas says, “We need to kill the Zionists, but not this week”—that’s the best deterrence we can achieve.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.